In World Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence (1942) Chapter III: Evidence and Collaboration, the first section is.
digraph EvidenceUncriticizedRefined{ // Global setup rankdir = BT // Node list lk [shape=oval color="blue" label="Learning"] ev [shape=box color="green" label="Evidence"] cse [shape=box color="green" label="Common Sense"] {rank=same ue cc re} ue [shape=box color="green" label="Uncriticized\nEvidence"] cc [shape=oval color="blue" label="Cognizing\ncritically"] re [shape=box color="green" label="Refined\nEvidence"] {rank=same pd op} pd [shape=box color="green" label="Preanlytic\nData"] op [shape=box color="green" label="Opinion"] aw [shape=oval color="blue" label="Accepting\nwithout\nreflection"] // Adding edges lk -> cse [dir=both arrowtail="onormal" arrowhead="onormal" arrowsize="0.8" label="affects"] lk -> ev [dir=both arrowtail="onormal" arrowhead="onormal" arrowsize="0.8" label="affects"] ev -> cse [arrowhead="curve" arrowsize="1.5" label="is\nexhibited\nby"] ue -> ev [arrowhead="onormal" arrowsize="1.5" label="is part of\n(consists)"] re -> ev [arrowhead="onormal" arrowsize="1.5" label="is part of\n(consists)"] ue -> cc [arrowhead="odot" label="is\nrequired\nby"] cc -> re [arrowhead="onormal" arrowsize="0.8" label="yields"] pd -> ue [arrowhead="onormal" arrowsize="1.5" xlabel="is part of\n(consists) "] op -> ue [arrowhead="onormal" arrowsize="1.5" label="is part of\n(consists)"] aw -> ue [arrowhead="onormal" arrowsize="0.8" label="yields"] }
> §1. Common sense > ... There appear to be two broad types of evidence: uncriticized, and criticized or refined evidence. Socially and individually, knowledge begins with the former and gradually passes into the latter. So let us begin by considering uncriticized evidence. > We often call this sort of evidence common sense. Plato called it "opinion." It has been called "preanalytical data," and "middle-sized fact." All these terms are useful; but no term could be wholly satisfactory, because "satisfactory" here tends to mean critically sound and what we wish to denote is something precritical and probably not critically sound. [p. 39] > Uncriticized, common-sense facts are the sort of things we think of when we ordinarily read the daily papers or novels depicting the ordinary life of men or the sort of things we see and hear and smell and feel as we walk along the street or in the country: that is the sound of a bird; it is three thousand miles across the continent; trains run every day on schedule, except in case of accident; there is space and there is time; the laws of nature have to quite a degree been discovered by scientists and the world runs according to them and scientists can predict by means of them; .... [pp. 39-40]
Pepper gets concrete with a discussion of Price's red tomato, as compared to Dewey's description. The interested reader should refer to the original text. The text continues with three traits.
> The first trait of a common-sense fact, then, is that it is not definitely cognized and generally not definitely cognizable. For such definite cognition immediately converts it into criticized fact. The same is true of all common-sense material, whether we should care to call it roughly fact, principle, belief, feeling, or what not. There is no implication in this assertion, of course, that whatever is the fact or the truth in a common-sense matter is not what it is. We simply cannot have any assurance that we know what it is without criticism. But then the matter ceases to be uncriticized and generally considerably changes in appearance. > A second trait of common-sense material is its security. Critical cognitions of the red tomato may come and go, diverge and conflict, but the common-sense tomato or something there, call it what you will, insists on cognition. This does not imply that some items of common sense do not disappear in the course of history. A great deal of common-sense material, we may be quite sure, is ancient or modern myth, science, and philosophy that has seeped down to an uncritical level, so that a highly criticized belief such as that water is H2O may be an item of common sense, as also that water is one of the four elements. One of these beliefs is a very recent accession to common sense, the other very ancient. Both came out of highly criticized cognition, and both may yet disappear from common sense. Common sense is not stable. But it is secure in that it is never lacking. It is, as we have noticed, an ultimate rebuke to the utter skeptic. [....] [p. 42] > But, thirdly, common sense is cognitively irritable. Secure as common sense is, and grateful as we may be to it for its limitless store of materials for cognition, still as cognizers the more we know it the less we like it. This attitude, I believe, is true even for men like Dewey, who profess to champion common sense, for in their careful critical defense they do not quite take common sense at its word. The materials of common sense are changing, unchanging, contradictory, vague, rigid, muddled, melodramatically clear, unorganized, rationalized, dogmatic, shrewdly dubious, recklessly dubious, piously felt, playfully enjoyed, and so forth. [....] Sometimes it will stand up to unlimited criticism, and then again break down at the first critical probing. It is unreliable, irresponsible, and, in a word, irritable. [p. 43-44]
Towards the end of the next section is the word _dubitatum_.
digraph CommonSenseEvidence { // Global setup rankdir = BT // Node list lk [shape=oval color="blue" label="Learning"] ev [shape=box color="green" label="Evidence"] cse [shape=box color="green" label="Common Sense"] {rank=same ue cc re} ue [shape=box color="green" label="Uncriticized\nEvidence"] cc [shape=oval color="blue" label="Cognizing\ncritically"] re [shape=box color="green" label="Refined\nEvidence"] {rank=same pd op} pd [shape=box color="green" label="Preanlytic\nData"] op [shape=box color="green" label="Opinion"] {rank=same db aw} db [shape=box color="green" label="Dubitandum"] aw [shape=oval color="blue" label="Accepting\nwithout\nreflection"] udb [shape=box color="green" label="Whole\nUncriticized\nDubitandum"] cl [shape=oval color="blue" label="Criticizing\nlegitimately"] co [shape=box color="green" label="Corroboration"] // Adding edges lk -> cse [dir=both arrowtail="onormal" arrowhead="onormal" arrowsize="0.8" label="affects"] lk -> ev [dir=both arrowtail="onormal" arrowhead="onormal" arrowsize="0.8" label="affects"] ev -> cse [arrowhead="curve" arrowsize="1.5" label="is\nexhibited\nby"] ue -> ev [arrowhead="onormal" arrowsize="1.5" label="is part of\n(consists)"] re -> ev [arrowhead="onormal" arrowsize="1.5" label="is part of\n(consists)"] ue -> cc [arrowhead="odot" label="is\nrequired\nby"] cc -> re [arrowhead="onormal" arrowsize="0.8" label="yields"] pd -> ue [arrowhead="onormal" arrowsize="1.5" xlabel="is part of\n(consists) "] op -> ue [arrowhead="onormal" arrowsize="1.5" label="is part of\n(consists)"] db -> ue [label="is\nan instance of"] udb -> db [arrowhead="onormal" arrowsize="1.5" label="is part of\n(consists)"] aw -> ue [arrowhead="onormal" arrowsize="0.8" label="yields"] cl -> cc [arrowhead="onormal" arrowsize="1.5" label="is part of\n(consists)"] co -> re [arrowhead="onormal" arrowsize="1.5" label="is part of\n(consists)"] cl -> co [arrowhead="onormal" arrowsize="0.8" label="yields"] }
> §2. Tension between common sense and refined knowledge. > [....] > This tension between common sense and expert knowledge, between cognitive security without responsibility and cognitive responsibility without full security, is the interior dynamics of the knowledge situation. The indefiniteness of much detail in common sense, its contradictions, its lack of established grounds, drive thought to seek definiteness, consistency, and reasons. Thought finds these in the criticized and refined knowledge of mathematics, science, and philosophy, only to discover that these tend to thin out into arbitrary definitions, pointer readings, and tentative hypotheses. Astounded at the thinness and hollowness of these culminating achievements of conscientiously responsible cognition, thought seeks matter for its definitions, significance for its pointer readings, and support for its wobbling hypotheses. Responsible cognition finds itself insecure as a result of the very earnestness of its virtues. But where shall it turn? It does, in fact, turn back to common sense, that indefinite and irresponsible source which it so lately scorned. But it does so, generally, with a bad grace. After filling its empty definitions and pointer readings and hypotheses with meanings out of the rich confusion of common sense, it generally turns its head away, shuts its eyes to what it has been doing, and affirms dogmatically the self-evidence and certainty of the common-sense significance it has drawn into its concepts. Then it pretends to be securely based on self-evident principles or indubitable facts. [pp. 44-45] [....] > Such, then, is the basic polarity of cognition, which we may expect to continue as long as we fall short of omniscience. On the one side, irresponsible but secure common sense; on the other, responsible but insecure critical cognition. We therefore acknowledge the importance and legitimacy of common-sense facts as evidence even in the face of the most polished critical evidence. We regret the instability and irresponsibility of common sense and shall therefore weigh it judiciously, but we shall not ignore it. Because of its need of criticism, we shall find it convenient to call a common-sense fact a _dubitandum_, an item of evidence that ought to be doubted.