Stephen C. Pepper makes the distinction between data and danda in Types of Corroboration. The logical positivists (of the [Vienna Circle](https://iep.utm.edu/viennacr/)) only respect data, and see danda as an arrangement of data.
This shows up in World Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence (1942), Chapter IV: Hypotheses , in the first section.
> ยง1. Views about hypotheses. > [....] > To the positivist a hypothesis is a human convention for the purpose of keeping data in order; it has no cognitive value in itself. He is, therefore, often cynical or gently indulgent with the wonder and admiration of the common man for scientific predictions. A prediction is nothing but an anticipated correlation, valueless if unconfirmed, and just one more multiplicative corroboration if it is confirmed. [....] > ... what we know are data. A hypothesis is not a datum; it is simply a symbolic scheme for the arrangement of data, so that men can easily find and use the data they know. Man has a limited memory and a limited attention. If it were not for these limitations he would not need hypotheses. He could just note data and their correlations and pick out the ones he needed when he needed them. But because of human limitations he does have to find convenient systems of organization for his data. > Ideally, these systems are in mathematical symbols and are deductive in form. The same data can often be organized in different systems, depending upon the postulates or primitive concepts employed. As between two such systems, the one most economical of a scientist's thought is the best. And this is proof, if any were needed, that such systems or hypotheses have no cognitive value in themselves. [pp. 71-72, editorial paragraphing addded] > [....] > This interpretation of hypotheses is known as conventionalism. This explains why, in many philosophical proofs, the arguments end up with mathematical formulas and logic.
Acknowledging other interpretations of what hypotheses mean, Pepper shows a pragmatist predisposition towards any World Theory in systems of structural corroboration as hypotheses.
> Other interpretations of hypotheses arise out of the results of refinement of cognition in terms of structural corroboration. There are, accordingly, as many of these structural views of hypotheses worthy of consideration as there are relatively adequate systems of structural corroboration. > * We are, therefore, faced with a peculiar difficulty at this point. We wish to regard these systems of structural corroboration, which are, of course, world theories, as hypotheses. > * We feel justified in doing so, in view of our observation that there are several of them, each making effective cognitive claims. > None of them can, we believe, support a claim of absolute truth, or certainty. They must, then, be hypothetical, be hypotheses. Yet we cannot enter into detail regarding the nature of hypotheses in terms of structural corroboration without finding ourselves involved in one of these world theories. [pp. 72-73, editorial paragraphing added]
The argument continues with Structural Corroboration towards World Theories.