The second of four Maxims of Root Metaphors in World Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence (1942), that each _world hypothesis_ is _autonomous_, complements Maxim I: A world hypothesis is determined by its root metaphor, and details some corollaries.
The adequacy of a _world hypothesis_ can be increased through structural refinement. If there were two similar _world hypotheses_, they could be merged, or one would be eliminated.
> If two or more world hypotheses handle their facts with the same degree of adequacy (so far as can be judged), and there is no world hypothesis of greater adequacy available, then there is no appeal beyond these hypotheses and each must be held to be as reliable as the other. The reason, of course, is that structural refinement reaches its culmination in world hypotheses, so that there is no cognitive appeal beyond the most adequate world hypotheses we have. [p. 98]
The first corollary speaks to integrity of a world hypothesis in internal consistency, that shouldn't be criticized from outside that system of structural corroboration.
> i) _It is illegitimate to disparage the factual interpretations of one world hypothesis in terms of the categories of another -- if both hypotheses are equally adequate_.
> This disparagement is an almost universal procedure, very plausible and entirely fallacious. [p. 98] [....] > Among the facts in the world that a relatively adequate world theory must adequately interpret are, of course, other world theories, and a world theory that cannot reasonably interpret the errors of other world theories is automatically inadequate. By that much it lacks the requisite scope. [...] > It follows that what are pure facts for one theory are highly interpreted evidence for another. This does not imply that there are no pure facts in the universe, but only that we do not know where they are. The danda of the best world hypotheses, however, are our best bet. It is the cognitive obligation of a world theory to interpret the danda and categories of other world theories in terms of its own categories. [p. 100]
The second corollary suggests that criticizing one _world hypothesis_ doesn't elevate the adequacy of another _world hypothesis_.
> ii) _It is illegitimate to assume that the claims of a given world hypothesis are established by the exhibition of the shortcomings of other world hypotheses_.
> This may be called the fallacy of clearing the ground. It assumes that if a theory is not perfect it is no good, and that if all other suggested theories are no good, then the ground is clear for whatever one's own theory can produce. This holds, of course, only if the suggested theory is more adequate than those rejected. [pp 100-101] > This is so obvious a fallacy that it is remarkable it should be so frequently used and to such persuasive effect. Yet a great proportion of philosophical -- and not only philosophical -- books give a large part of their space to polemic, finding the faults in rival theories with an idea that this helps to establish the theory proposed. > * The cognitive value of a hypothesis is not one jot increased by the cognitive errors of other hypotheses. Most polemic is a waste of time, or an actual obfuscation of the evidence. [....] > If a theory is any good it can stand on its own evidence. > The only reason for referring to other theories in constructive cognitive endeavor is to find out what other evidence they may suggest, or other matters of positive cognitive value. > * We need all world hypotheses, so far as they are adequate, for mutual comparison and correction of interpretative bias. [p. 101, editorial paragraphing added]
The third corollary reinforces that a world hypothesis is built on corroborating structurally on danda. Corroborating multiplicatively is a different Type of Corroboration in a larger Common Sense and Evidence.
> iii) _It is illegitimate to subject the results of structural refinement (world hypotheses) to the cognitive standards (or limitations) of multiplicative refinement_. > Data cannot legislate over danda. Data must be accepted as evidence to be accounted for in a world hypothesis, but a world hypothesis does not have to accept data at their face value, or to exclude acceptance of any other sort of evidence than data. [p. 101]
The fourth corollary reminds that structural refinement is on danda, not on dubitanda (that might become data) in the larger Common Sense and Evidence.
> iv) _It is illegitimate to subject the results of structural refinement to the assumptions of common sense_. > Dubitanda must be accepted as evidence to be accounted for, but, as we have seen, hardly ever at their face value. And this is without disparagement to the ultimate cognitive security of common sense. [p. 102]
The fifth corollary says that comparison across mulitple world hypotheses should be possible, in a common sense way.
> v) _It is convenient to employ common-sense concepts as bases for comparison for parallel fields of evidence among world theories_. > Dubitanda definitions of a group of facts are the best test definitions for the comparison of parallel danda definitions in different world theories. [....] > If we want to compare the views of the two men, we can do no better than compare their different interpretations of what may be called the "same" fact. Yet the fact is never literally the same, because, if it were, the description or interpretation would be just the same, which never happens if the categories are really different. [p. 102] > [....] As a maxim of method, then, we find that there is no better way of entering upon the study of a field of fact than through common sense. Let the subject be perception, physical body, personal freedom, the law of gravitation, legal right, aesthetic beauty, myself, identity, space, yellow, saltiness, anger, air, action, truth—whatever you will, the essay or the book will most profitably begin with the common-sense meanings of these terms and then proceed to refinements of interpretation which can be compared with one another on the basis of their mutual points of origin. [p. 104]